Supreme Court Decision Regarding The Breach Of Engagement
Article 4 of Law No. 4787 on the Establishment, Duties, and Procedures of Family Courts stipulates that all cases arising from matters regulated in Articles 118-395 of the Turkish Civil Code, excluding the third part of the second book of the Turkish Civil Code No. 4721, shall be heard by the family court.
Since Article 122 of the Turkish Civil Code concerning the return of engagement gifts is included in Book 2 of the Turkish Civil Code, such cases must be heard and decided by the family court in places where there is an independent family court, and in places where no independent family court has been established, by the Civil Courts of First Instance designated as family courts by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. (Supreme Court HGK, dated 16.11.2005, 2005/2-673 E. 2005/617 K.)
Jurisdiction is related to public order and must be taken into consideration by the court ex officio at every stage of the proceedings.
In this case, considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a procedural rule related to public order and must be taken into account ex officio even if not raised by the parties, the court should have decided that the case should be heard by the Family Court or, in places where there is no Family Court, by the Civil Court of First Instance acting as a Family Court. However, as a result of an erroneous assessment, the trial continued without considering the issue of jurisdiction in the capacity of a Civil Court of First Instance, and a decision was made on the merits of the case, which was found to be contrary to procedure and law, and this issue required reversal.
Based on the reason for reversal, it was not deemed necessary to examine the defendant’s attorney’s appeal objections at this time.
CONCLUSION: The written judgment is unfounded without considering the above-mentioned principles, and the appeals are well-founded for these reasons. Therefore, the judgment is REVERSED pursuant to Article 428 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the advance appeal fee shall be refunded to the appellant upon request. This decision was made unanimously on March 19, 2015.
