Violation Of Freedom Of Expression Due To Termination Of Employment Contract Because Of Social Media Posting
Events
The applicant worked at the Public Health Directorate (the Institution) under a fixed-term employment contract with a private company (subcontractor). The applicant posted a personal message on their social media account addressing the pressure faced by subcontracted workers and their managers, including the phrase “O you human drafts, you manager impostors…” Due to this post, some Institution managers complained about the applicant, and in the lawsuit filed, the Criminal Court of First Instance ruled to convict the applicant. Upon the finalization of the decision to postpone the announcement of the aforementioned ruling, the subcontractor terminated the applicant’s employment contract. The applicant’s claim for reinstatement against the subcontractor and the Institution was dismissed by the Labor Court (Court). The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Regional Court of Appeals (Chamber), and his appeal to the Court of Cassation was also dismissed.
Allegations
The applicant claimed that his freedom of expression was violated when his employment contract was terminated due to a social media post about the managers of the public institution where he worked for a subcontractor.
The Court’s Assessment
In addition to working at the Institution as an employee of the subcontractor, the applicant also serves as the president of an association that works on behalf of subcontracted workers employed by public institutions. In this context, it should be accepted that the views expressed by the applicant on issues related to subcontracted workers go beyond his identity as a subcontracted worker and also cover social issues within the scope of interest of the civil society organization he represents, as required by his role as president of the association.
The applicant used the general term “manager” in his post but did not use any expression indicating that his words targeted a specific person. The courts, however, accepted that some of the addressees of the words were managers of the Institution, citing the applicant’s status as a subcontracted worker and the fact that those involved in the criminal case were also managers at the same Institution as the applicant. The courts of first instance accepted that the applicant’s main purpose was to disparage the managers of the Institution, but this was only possible by attributing meanings to the words used by the applicant that went beyond the meaning he intended.
Moreover, the applicant claimed in his statements that the pressure exerted on subcontracted workers could only be carried out by “people who lack managerial and human qualities”; he presented his criticisms in an exaggerated manner. The Constitutional Court has accepted in many of its decisions that freedom of expression must be interpreted broadly, to the extent that it allows for exaggeration and even provocation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the statements in question in this specific case require a departure from the Constitutional Court’s previous assessments.
Ultimately, the lower courts failed to demonstrate in an objective and convincing manner that the statements in question warranted such a severe and last-resort intervention as termination of the employment contract.
The Constitutional Court ruled that freedom of expression had been violated based on the reasons stated.